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Justice from an Interdisciplinary 
Perspective: The Impact of the 
Revolution in Human Sciences on Peace 
Research and International Relations
Harald Müller
2.1  Introduction: Towards Scientifically Founded 
Anthropological Assumptions for Political 
Science
Peace and justice are often regarded as a settled pairing in theoretical writings—
but what do we know about their empirical relationship? Will deepening research 
into this relationship pay off at all? Insights from other disciplines which have 
been involved in the “revolution in human sciences” for decades should serve as a 
powerful incentive in a field like international relations, which has always closely 
followed other disciplines for stimulation: Neuroscientists have located the cir-
cuits in the brain responsible for adverse reactions to violations of claims for 
justice. Evolutionary biologists have identified rules of distribution and retribu-
tion not only in early human societies but among contemporary social species as 
well. Psychologists have tracked the emergence of a sense of justice in very early 
childhood, while in experiments behavioral economists have identified behavior 
by “average” people that deviated significantly from the model of “economic 
man” and could only be explained by a sense of justice. The chapter discusses 
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these findings and identifies implications for the study of war and peace between 
and within states.
In doing so, this chapter aims at escaping from the intellectual straightjacket 
imposed by the narrow and incomplete perspective of humans as selfish, mate-
rialistic utility-seekers and of methodological individualism. It starts from the 
assumption that humans are as much moral as they are selfish (Monroe et al. 
2009), that they are as much emotional as they are rational, and that they are as 
much social-communal as they are individual.
Based on these assumptions, “justice”, the time-honored moral concept of 
political theory since ancient times, is presented as a central issue in interna-
tional relations. This proposition is not based on philosophical deliberations, 
but on insights from many academic disciplines, including “hard sciences”. As 
I will show on the following pages, these insights converge on the empirically 
supported proposition that humans are endowed with what could be called in lay-
person’s terms a “sense of justice” and that this disposition in the hard wiring of 
our brain has momentous political consequences not only at the individual, small 
group and intergroup level, but also in politics and international relations. In a 
nutshell, the presence or absence of perceived justice is a key factor that decides 
on war and peace.
There is no doubt that peace without justice contains tensions between those 
suffering from perceived unjust treatment and those responsible for such treat-
ment, as those on the receiving end of injustice will develop the “justice motive” 
(Lerner 1977) to close the gap between their justice claim and its lack of fulfill-
ment. These tensions may endanger the stability of peace: unjust peace has the 
negative connotation of being unsustainable. Just peace, by contrast, displays 
the extremely important attribute of continuity and permanence. This statement 
should not come as a surprise. Justice means in general that members of a given 
community obtain what they can justly claim (“suum cuique”). When this is 
the case, satisfaction with the status quo prevails and the respective social order 
enjoys legitimacy. There is no motivation for violent resistance in order to create 
basic change. Under these circumstances, peace is sustainable.1
1Unfortunately, there are those predisposed to using violence not only to combat injustice 
but also for other purposes, who by doing so reduce this conceptually sound statement, 
contrary to its deterministic language, from an assertion of absolute truth to a probability 
proposition.
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2.2  Losing the J-Theme: The Weight of Paradigmatic 
Hegemony
The pedigree of the philosophical debate on justice and the gravity of its concep-
tual assumptions about human destiny should have motivated intense empirical 
research, but there is amazingly little to be found. Inevitably, empirical research-
ers have uncovered interesting insights into the role of distributive conflicts and 
their resolution in the sustainability of peace agreements, on the role of non-rec-
ognition in conflicts within and among political communities, on the impact of 
transitional justice on post-civil war societies, and on the meaning of fair pro-
cedures for the acceptance of negotiation results—all subjects intimately related 
to the idea of justice (e.g., Albin 2001; Albin and Druckman 2008, 2010, 2014; 
Druckman and Wagner 2017; Zartman 1997, 2008). But these insights have had 
only marginal influence on the great theoretical debates, if any at all, and they 
have not informed thinking on conflict and conflict resolution in international 
relations to the degree they deserve. As David Welch, a pioneer in thinking about 
justice in international relations (Welch 1993), has recently written, the reason is 
most probably paradigmatic hegemony (Welch 2014).
This certainly begs the question how empirical research about politics could 
lose sight of one of the key subjects of the social sciences and humanities: the 
meaning of morality and ethics in human affairs. Morality, at the center of the 
academy for millennia while philosophers and theologians were at the helm, 
has receded into small niches of scientific interest in modern science—though 
we have to give the philosophers credit for helping to keep the topic alive until 
now. In the social sciences, it has been consigned to the margins. For Marxists 
and poststructuralist, late Nietzscheans, morality is an ideological superstructure 
concealing the material or ideational basis of society. Similarly, rationalists view 
moral arguments as instruments of a rhetorical strategy (Schimmelfennig 2001) 
for overcoming resistance to actors’ material interests (while never asking the 
question how moral arguments could exert influence among interest-pursuing 
actors in the first place). The social-Darwinist inheritance of (utilitarian) ration-
alism is only inadequately papered over by the apparent liberty rationalists have 
to identify their actors’ (theoretically also altruistic) “preferences” (e.g., Lake 
and Powell 1999; Snidal 2013). In almost every empirical study informed by a 
rationalist perspective, it is the material, egotistic interests of individuals or their 
groupings that drive behavior, and the connection to the “survival” doctrine of 
the social Darwinists in this approach is not hard to identify. This view is alive 
despite all accumulated evidence that the “justice motive” is different from “self-
interest” (Markovsky 2017, pp. 115 f.).
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All these approaches (we can include realism and neo-realism because both 
rely on an anthropology that focuses on survival or the egotistic enhancement of 
power, or both) have the anthropological assumption of egotistic individualism in 
common. Motivations driving groupings (such as clans, city-states, feudal enti-
ties or states) are mere extensions of what drives individuals. It is very hard to 
see a logical way morality could emerge from these basic assumptions about how 
humans are structured. As stated above, to treat morality instrumentally begs the 
question how it could be an instrument of persuasion for a group of egoists. This 
question remains unanswered.
Constructivists, by contrast, view ideational motivation as a permanent part 
of human dispositions and behavior. They postulate great variance in the sub-
stantive structure of these dispositions, as they are rooted in cultures which are 
historically path-dependent and thus vastly different when, say, the culture of a 
South East Asian society is compared with that of a sub-Saharan African or a 
Scandinavian one. There is little or no connection with the “hard science” basis 
of these assumptions. Constructivists rely on the tradition of social sciences and 
social philosophy. For quite some time now, this has been a disadvantage vis-à-
vis rationalism connected to evolutionary biology (though in the highly doubtful 
version of social Darwinism), with rationalism thus enjoying a more respectable 
“scientific” reputation (Jackson 2010).
2.3  The Key Role of Unproven Anthropological 
Assumptions
The hegemonic social science paradigm that has informed much of IR work is 
thus rationalism (Lake and Powell 1999). Humans are rational utility-seekers and 
maximizers or optimizers. Realism and neo-realism are variations of this basic 
theme. Structures emerge out of the strategic interaction of actors with different 
preferences which are frequently in opposition to each other. Structures then deter-
mine the strategic choices of actors; depending on the choices made, outcomes 
ensue and, from time to time, new preferences and structures emerge. Rational-
ity may be limited through lack of information, and information exchange may 
become part of the strategic interaction among actors. Actors—whether natu-
ral persons or collectives—must be regarded as “individuals” who are only kept 
together by virtue of their strategic interaction and the resulting structures.
I am not interested here in the fine-tuning of the whole theory and its applica-
tion in IR, but in the skeleton of the anthropological assumptions that constitute 
their basis. As is well known, this very special anthropology has been imported 
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from the academic field of economics. It should be emphasized that economics 
has adopted this anthropology without any preceding empirical anthropologi-
cal studies. The founders of modern economics derived their conclusions from 
their lay observation of everyday behavior and expanded their conclusions to a 
simple if not primitive theory of how human beings “tick”. When Charles Dar-
win laid the groundwork for evolutionary biology, pundits of utilitarian political 
economy were quick to jump on the bandwagon; lacking their own foundation 
in the hard sciences, here they found what they needed to bolster the “scientific” 
claim of their field. The struggle for survival of the fittest and the perceived “bet-
terment”—in both physical and intellectual capacities—through the historical 
process of organic evolution appeared to support what economists viewed as the 
emulation of the biological template in the market system and the resulting better-
ment of human affairs resulting from ever more efficient production and distribu-
tion modes.
IR scholars of the realist and rationalist faith then followed this example, 
claiming, like the economists, scientific status based on the noble “hard science” 
pedigree behind the paradigm adopted. While rationalists focused closely on 
the micro-level, realists looked at the big picture (most notably Waltz 1979). In 
extremis, they described world history as a merciless fight for survival in which 
states had no other choice than to arm, to ally, and to fight, in order to survive. This 
sophisticated social Darwinism found its most consistent expression in “offensive 
realism” (Mearsheimer 2001). Never mind that the extinction rate in the world of 
states is surprisingly small, that many states focus on things other than survival, 
since they survive anyway, and that even extinct states may experience surpris-
ing resurrections—something highly unusual in the biological world other than 
through Jurassic Park techniques, which still belong in the realm of fiction.
The anthropological assumptions of rationalism have experienced many 
attacks, in the most sustained way by constructivists who wanted to leave the 
materialist ground on which rationalism is ultimately based and to give the idea-
tional factors inherent in the human brain and in the social life of humans their 
due. But even constructivist work has succumbed at times to key elements of the 
rationalist paradigm, such as the evolutionary theory of norms (Florini 1996) or 
the utilitarian motivation of political leaders in John Owen’s theory of forced 
regime change (Owen 2010). In many ways, rationalism offered the anthropologi-
cal default option to which even critics of rationalism would revert when neces-
sary. The reason was most probably the aura of “being scientific” resulting from 
the rationalist basis in economics (allegedly the most “scientific” social science, 
despite the endless sequence of incorrect prognoses), which in turn was rooted 
in an oversimplified and misunderstood interpretation of Darwinist evolutionary 
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biology (Jackson 2010). Two images prevailed: “economic man” (Ingram 1888) 
and the “selfish gene” (Dawkins 1976).
Of course, any political theory must rely on basic anthropological assump-
tions. Without such assumptions, there can be no hypothesis about the motives 
and directions of human action, individual or collective. In modernity, these 
assumptions have been gathered in a rather amateurish, ad-hoc way, and they 
reflect the beliefs of academics to a far greater degree than any hard knowledge, 
from Morgenthau’s “lust for power” (Morgenthau 1968) through Waltz’s con-
cern for security, to the prevailing rationalist paradigm of utility-maximization. 
In the past, political analysts could be excused by pointing to the vast discrepancy 
between existing “hard” knowledge and the ad-hoc assumptions related to the 
presently most plausible relevant “hard knowledge” to which they clung, namely 
evolutionary biology as understood by social scientists.2
The time for such excuses has passed as a result of scientific advances over 
the last few decades. For the first time since the academic faculties split as a con-
sequence of scientific development in the era of the Enlightenment, we may be 
facing a period of convergence for a wide range of academic fields from hard sci-
ences such as neuroscience or evolutionary biology to sociology and political sci-
ence (international relations included) and cultural sciences such as ethnology or 
literature. A chorus of jubilation could be expected over the immense opportuni-
ties this development is creating, over new, vast domains of academic possibilities 
opening before our eyes. It is a kind of underselling to speak only of an “emo-
tional turn”, which would be another temporary fashion for marketing a limited 
new idea imported from elsewhere (Hutchison and Bleiker 2014, p. 492). What is 
happening here is nothing less than a revolution across the field, based on a new 
and scientifically-based image of the human species and its motivational disposi-
tions (Crawford 2011). Despite this, most scholars stick to their old models, from 
rational choice to post-structuralism, and neglect the marvelous chance of enrich-
ing our knowledge.3
2For a biting critique, see Bauer (2010, Chap. 5, pp. 185 ff.). Remarkably, Richard Ned 
Lebow (2008) has developed a completely different set of anthropological assumptions 
from ancient Greek philosophers’ speculations on the nature of human beings which were 
based only on seasoned and sharp observation. Lebow has applied this theory to the his-
tory of international relations and to war studies, and has gained amazing insights (Lebow 
2010). Typically, the mainstream has ignored this work.
3At least the special issue on emotions and IR of International Theory, edited by Emma 
Hutchison and Roland Bleiker, was a sign of hope (see Hutchison and Bleiker 2014).
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No social or political theory whose assumptions about human beings do not 
pass three crucial tests is sustainable nowadays. First, theories must be plausible 
in the light of evolutionary requirements: All attributes ascribed to human beings 
by social and political scientists must have a plausible evolutionary history in the 
human species, a history during which individuals have always been embedded 
in groups rather than being lone wolves. The attributes must be supported by at 
least some empirical evidence in evolutionary biology and anthropology (Hatemi 
and McDermott 2011b). Second, they must not contradict recent insights by neu-
roscience and neurobiology. These sciences, though quite young, are deciphering 
the structure and functions of the brain at astonishing speed, making use of rap-
idly developing new technologies. Third, they must find some support in the rap-
idly growing body of experimental research in sociology, social psychology and 
behavioral economics.
2.4  Insights on the Justice Motive from Many 
Disciplines
Trying to distill the knowledge from various scientific fields with a view to 
obtaining answers to key questions is akin to a fool’s errand: too many possible 
sources in too many unknown fields, and too much specialist knowledge needed 
to understand what these far-away colleagues are writing. The best an interested 
layperson can do is to start with the few scientific authors who care (and are 
capable) of presenting their field to a broader, interested audience, and to work 
through their key references to touch upon a wider circle of writings. This is what 
I have done in preparing this chapter.
2.4.1  The Justice-Seeking Human as Social 
Animal: Insights from Evolutionary Biology 
and Anthropology
There is no way to understand political motivation, choices, and sociality with-
out a deep look at the evolutionary history of the human species. Evolution 
has led to the emergence of key universal traits underlying preferences and 
 influencing political attitudes and decisions which work through the structure of 
the brain (see below) and the central and peripheral nervous systems. Moreover, 
traits transferred by individual’s genetic inheritance show considerable variabil-
ity; some individual differences in political orientation and reaction to specific 
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 environments are probably inherited: “Individuals with different traits may 
respond differently to the same trigger, just as individuals with the same trait may 
respond similarly to different cures [sic!]. In essence, part of an individual’s trait 
may include inclinations how to best interpret the environment; some individu-
als will see threat where others see opportunity” (Hatemi and McDermott 2011a, 
p. 25). To understand political behavior in general, knowledge of the universals is 
essential. To understand single cases of decision making at the microlevel, recog-
nizing individual differences is necessary. I am interested here in the big picture, 
and thus focus on the universal characteristics of human sociality.
Human beings, compared with all other species, need an extraordinarily long 
development period to grow up to a degree where they are capable of surviving 
on their own. For one and a half decades they are relatively helpless and need 
protection and provision of food and other necessities by adult persons. Not only 
their bodily competencies need this long period of childhood and adolescence to 
achieve full strength, their brain also needs this long period for full development 
and, in addition, for mastering the content of cultural knowledge for coping with 
the challenges of life, which is the outstanding characteristic of our species.
To survive this long “under-age” period of life, humans must be embedded in 
groups (of variable size, see below) which care for them. This necessitates cer-
tain attributes in our “genetic hard wiring” which we do not share with all spe-
cies on earth, nor with all vertebrates or mammals, but only with those which, 
like us, live in groups whose social coherence provides the necessary environ-
ment for survival. This social embedding may include the possibility of being 
adopted if a child’s natural parents die very early, or of being cared for in the 
case of handicaps, injuries, illness and the disabilities connected with old age. All 
these possibilities have been shown to have existed in early human society and 
exist in great-ape groups (de Waal 2015, pp. 69, 83). In other words, apart from 
the capability of surviving as individuals (which humans must do—like any other 
species—in order to deliver their genes to the next generation), humans need 
the capability to help their group survive and to function in a surviving group, 
in order to master life individually and as a species through the course of evolu-
tion. Behavioral traits (and their biophysical substrate) that foster group cohesion 
and strength are a condition for evolutionary success of any social species (more 
below). Brian Skyrms has shown in a series of evolutionary game simulations that 
cooperative traits related to fairness/justice beat selfishness in the “competition 
for fitness” (Skyrms 2014).
If this assumption holds true, we should find behavioral regularities selected 
by the necessity of functioning in a group and making the group function in 
non-human species which are also “social”. Most prominently, we should find 
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 similarities with our closest relatives, the great apes, and these similarities should 
even extend to attributes of the brain, as far as it has been already deciphered.
Evolutionary biologists (Bekoff and Pierce 2009), primate researchers (de 
Waal 2009; Yamamoto and Takimoto 2012) and anthropologists (Boehm 2001) 
have explained the competitive advantages of species living in social communi-
ties which result from fairness rules concerning distribution of food, punishment 
for unruly behavior (Brosnan and de Waal 2012), and accepted rules for making 
decisions in the group, whether they are more hierarchical or more egalitarian. 
Such rules (from simple to complex) were found in an astonishing array of social 
species ranging from cleaner fish through coyotes, wolves and crows (Bekoff and 
Pierce 2009) to our closest relatives, the primates, notably the great apes, and 
finally to early human societies (Boehm 2001).
Among the great apes, chimpanzees and bonobos are our cousins. We share 
a common ancestor, and we share certain traits in behavioral patterns and brain 
structure with both, even though the two species are different. Chimpanzees live 
in patriarchal societies, are strictly hierarchical, relatively competitive and violent 
(but with rules) internally, and strongly violent towards other groups of the same 
species. Bonobos live in slightly matriarchal societies, are more inclined to solve 
internal conflict non-violently (with the aid of frequent sexual intercourse in the 
service of conflict management and resolution) and, while careful to protect ter-
ritorial borders, are inclined to fraternize with bonobo outgroups rather than make 
war on them (de Waal 2015, pp. 24 f., 92 ff.).
As de Waal observes, these great apes, like humans, strive for power, secu-
rity, and affection from others, love sex, defend their territory, and appreciate 
trust and cooperation (de Waal 2015, p. 29). We also find elements of a sense of 
justice/fairness in these species. It starts with “inequity aversion”, the disinclina-
tion to tolerate unfair (unequal) treatment in distribution situations (de Waal 2015, 
pp. 30 f.). It appears that we share with the chimpanzee a disposition to strong 
intragroup competitiveness, balanced by the striving for intragroup cooperation, 
and with the bonobos a very strong disposition to empathy, based on the VEN 
neuron type, which both we and they possess (de Waal 2015, pp. 112 ff.).4
Chimpanzees and bonobos both display clear behavioral patterns concern-
ing food distribution (de Waal 2015, p. 170). Chimpanzees principally share 
meat gained from hunting. Successful hunting is followed by loud calls from 
4This does not by any means imply that chimpanzees are not empathic. They are. Inter 
alia, experiments have shown that chimpanzees prefer to share food with a group member 
observing them when they could have enjoyed it alone (de Waal 2015, pp. 165 f.).
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the  hunters, signaling the imminent feast. Concerning “vegetarian food” (fruits, 
leaves, branches), by contrast, the possessor of the food distributes it. However, 
other group members—even alpha individuals—start begging, and usually the 
possessor will hand over part of the food to other group members.5 Approach-
ing special places where food is located (e.g., in captivity), the social  hierarchy 
decides on the sequence in which individuals are admitted to the source. In 
 bonobo societies, female individuals, according to their rank order, approach first. 
Even leading males come later (de Waal 2015, pp. 108 f., 175 f., 260).
Implementation of justice is also an important element for reducing the degree 
of (violent) conflict in a group. In chimpanzee and bonobo societies, older indi-
viduals (not necessarily the actual alpha members) act as arbiters in intragroup 
conflicts—notably conflicts where violence is actually used or threatened to be 
used—and excel by their complete impartiality (if friends or close relatives are 
involved, they are not favored) (de Waal 2015, pp. 34 f., 67 f.).
Altogether, in the world of primates we find the characteristic ambivalence 
which we know from human society: The social world is a world of competi-
tion (which can become very tough and cruel), but on the other hand it is also 
an environment with traits of community, where norms of appropriateness apply, 
sympathy and help from others can be expected, and isolation and loneliness of 
the individual is a deviant—pathological—situation (de Waal 2015, p. 43; Proctor 
and Brosnan 2011).
5As an amateur bonobo observer, stimulated by de Waal’s imposing studies, I regularly 
watch the quite sizable bonobo community in the Frankfurt Zoo. Two recent observations 
confirm de Waal’s propositions: In the first episode, a very young individual, sitting close 
to his/her mother, was holding and eating a banana. An older, very senior female (possi-
bly the alpha) approached and showed her interest in eating the banana. Rather than tak-
ing it, it started begging the little one for a piece. The baby reacted in the cutest possible 
way. It took a bite and transferred it with a kiss into the mouth of the senior. She kissed 
back and all three apes smiled at each other. In the second episode, an older female was 
holding a branch with apparently quite delicate leaves. When she let go of it for a moment 
an adolescent male jumped from a tree stealing the branch. The female shouted and pur-
sued the perpetrator. Even when he let go of the branch she pursued him, caught him and 
hit him several times but without inflicting wounds. The mother of the adolescent watched 
the scene without any reaction. The adolescent sat in a corner, not even approaching his 
mother for consolation. In the first episode, food distribution rules were observed by all 
three participants, even the very young one (and how charmingly!). In the second episode, 
the rules were violated, and retributive justice followed. The mother did not interfere, thus 
putting the rules before kinship. And even the perpetrator showed what could be interpreted 
as signs of remorse in the end.
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Many primates, not only our closest cousins, share the capability to cooper-
ate, a strong aversion against inequality, a concern for status (recognition), and an 
inclination to observe social rules (for a hierarchical order of status, food distribu-
tion, reciprocity and alliance building) that helps mitigate the possibly devastating 
consequences of status competition and inequality aversion within social groups 
(Proctor and Brosnan 2011).
Looking at more recent work in the field of anthropology, we find strong par-
allels of early human social life to primate societies. Charles Boehm described in 
great detail the development of food-sharing rules and how the ambitions of very 
strong individuals have been tamed by the emergence of egalitarian practices and 
norms in human hunter-gatherer societies (Boehm 2001). He also demonstrated 
that deviant behavior has been punished by shaming, blaming and temporal isola-
tion, while persistent deviants who threaten the integrity of the group have suf-
fered expulsion or even the death penalty (Boehm 2001, 2012).
What applies to primates from an evolutionary perspective applies to early 
human society as well: in addition to the individual capability to survive, the 
group’s capability to survive is decisive for successful evolutionary develop-
ment, as the group, in turn, is the necessary condition for the individual’s sur-
vival. Group survival depends on viable and predictable relationships within the 
group, where competition, cooperation and mutual care must be balanced. The 
balance ultimately hinges on valid rules of justice/fairness based on mutual rec-
ognition, reciprocity, practices of sharing and care, and punishment of inappropri-
ate behavior. All these norms and practices are instantiations of the principle of 
“suum cuique”, which appears to be interculturally accepted as the highest and 
most general principle of justice, whereas the specific substance of “suum” and 
“cui” varies considerably within and between cultures.6 But the existence of such 
rules removes many conflict triggers from society as it combines a shared sense 
of “appropriateness” with the feeling that individuals, independently of their par-
ticular status in the group, will get their due, that deviations from the norms will 
be corrected, and that wrongdoers will be punished. Justice, order, and group 
coherence are thus intimately connected (de Waal 2015, p. 304 ff.).
These aspects of justice in societal species are likely to relate to four evolu-
tionary functions:
First, to keep the largest number of group members alive in order to have a 
“reserve of individuals” in hard times and, more immediately, to be capable of 
resisting attacks by predators from other species or by rival groups of the same 
6For an intercultural discussion, see the contributions in Polylog 3 (2001).
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species in the competition for the territory in which the group lives. Rules for 
sharing food are essential. It has to be emphasized that this does not necessarily 
mean equal sharing. In many social species, alpha individuals eat first and obtain 
the best pieces of food, yet weaker individuals are not denied. The sharing func-
tion serves to prevent group members from starving and to provide enough food 
for next-generation group members to grow successfully. Caring for children 
as a collective task (Hrdy 2010) including, just in case, the practice of adoption 
as mentioned above, serves the same general function, which deviates from the 
templates of both utilitarian egotism of the individual and of the “selfish gene”. 
Christopher Boehm also argues that food sharing (notably applying to meat, with 
its significant protein supply) evens out survival conditions among group mem-
bers between the strongest and the weakest. He also notes that sharing extends 
beyond the narrow kinship group and includes non-relatives in the band (Boehm 
2001, pp. 184 ff.). All this, he emphasizes, favors more altruistic groups in inter-
band competition (Boehm 2001, pp. 218 ff.).
Second, keeping the group effective (decision-making). Social animals have 
and early human societies had distinct rules concerning how to make decisions. 
Primate societies are hierarchical in various ways, but it appears that it would be 
too easy to ascribe decision-making power only to the chimpanzee or bonobo 
alpha animal. Rather, primate researchers observe various coalitions on which 
even alphas have to rely. Human hunter and gatherer societies as well as agri-
culture-based tribal societies are more egalitarian. Boehm argues that apart from 
the “lust for power”, which he sees as a natural trait in (mostly male) humans, 
and the readiness to (reluctantly) submit to a superior “alpha” in order to avoid 
harm, there is the equally strong desire to preserve the individual’s autonomy 
against others’ aspiration for dominance (Boehm 2001, pp. 67, 163 f.). Using a 
broad spectrum of historical and ethnographic evidence, he maintains that these 
societies have found ways of neutralizing this aspiration, and have helped nature 
in favoring the selection of the genes of more altruistic and empathic individu-
als by treating strongly deviant “big egos” through ostracism or even execution 
(Boehm 2001, pp. 27 f.). Human hunter and gatherer societies are more egalitar-
ian; the development of hunting tools for killing game produced an equalizing 
effect of “political” rivalry comparable to a pre-weapon competition based on the 
individuals’ raw physical strength (Boehm 2001, pp. 180 f.). Decisions are mostly 
discussed among the (adult male) members of the group/band and require con-
sensus in the group. These modes, internalized by group members, have proven 
effective enough to permit the group to survive.
Third, enforcing rules (punishment). The emotions which accompany the posi-
tive experience of being treated justly and the negative emotions connected with 
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perceived unfairness serve important functions both for the individual and for the 
group. They help the individual get what he/she needs for survival and they help 
the group to stick together and maintain the bonds needed for the collaboration 
that is essential for survival (Keltner et al. 2006). Retributive justice (Wenzel and 
Okimoto 2016) is observable across social vertebrate species (Proctor and Brosnan 
2011, pp. 55 f.). Punishment follows the inappropriate application of force, 
for example when young wolves, coyotes or dogs are punished for a dispropor-
tionately sharp bite during play, or when chimpanzees or bonobos hurt another 
group member severely in a rivalry or sex competition situation, or when a group 
member appropriates food to which another member had a justified claim (de 
Waal 2015, p. 219; for findings concerning canids, cf. Bekoff 2001). Even supe-
rior group members (alphas) may suffer punishment in such situations (de Waal 
2015, pp. 215 f., 219 f.). De Waal reports an episode in a bonobo group where 
a high-status male, by approaching a female in whom he was interested was ter-
rifying her baby and thus endangering it. The event led to one of the very few 
instances of violence in the group, with highly emotionalized members ganging 
up against the perpetrator because of his “crime” (de Waal 2015, pp. 109 f.).
Punishment may range from vocal disapproval through minor physical ret-
ribution to the ultimate horror punishment, expulsion from the group. Isolation 
from the community can cause death in the wilderness. Individuals in social 
species are primed to avoid this fate: The human brain, for example, reacts very 
strongly to experiences of isolation. Lack of success in intimate relations, or their 
breakdown, or the loss of a very close individual creates stress and anxiety. In 
extremis, the whole motivational system may collapse or may focus on aggression 
as a means of gaining recognition and group membership (Bauer 2010, pp. 39 f., 
63 ff., 75 ff.). This explains the key role of “recognition justice”, the claim to be 
accepted as a worthy member of the club, in the order of human justice claims 
as priority “suum cuique”. It also helps understand the devastating psychological 
impact of successful mobbing activities in modern social interactions.
Charles Boehm documents punishment practices against (powerful) devi-
ants on a very broad empirical basis (Boehm 2001, Chaps. 3 and 4). He assumes 
that in hunter/gatherer societies, deadly punishment of violent and psychopathic 
deviators has shifted the human gene pool towards the more altruistic, moral and 
cooperative side (Boehm 2012), an effect he also ascribes to intergroup compe-
tition/selection, in which groups with strong coherence (based on altruism and 
justice/fairness rules) fare better than their competitors composed of egoists 
(Boehm 2001, Chap. 9). At any rate, punishment of inappropriateness has cer-
tainly served another important function, namely preservation of the coherence 
of the group.
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Fourth, keeping the group together. This is no trivial task given the inevita-
ble and in many regards functionally beneficial role of intragroup competition 
and conflict. These centrifugal forces had to be kept in check in order to preserve 
group cohesion as the key to both group and individual survival when facing three 
challenges:
The first challenge emanated from predators which could jeopardize the sur-
vival of the group in the early phase of human evolution.
The second challenge was the occasional encounter between different human 
groups which could result in violent and deadly competition (Boehm 2001, 
pp. 158 f.). The evolutionary “genetic response” is very clearly reflected in the 
finding of De Dreu and others that the production of oxytocin—one of the mes-
senger substances triggering feelings of wellbeing and happiness—in the human 
brain is activated more frequently when mutual trust and close collaboration in a 
group is reaffirmed while the group is confronted with a rival or hostile outgroup 
(De Dreu et al. 2010). Mutual trust is a result of being treated fairly in your own 
group. On the one hand, the oxytocin level rises as a result of such experiences 
and, on the other hand, they enhance mutual trust (Bauer 2010, p. 47).
The third challenge is the “stag hunt” temptation in joint hunting. “Stag hunt” 
is a paradigmatic game theory construction in which individuals of a hunting 
band are tempted to desert the common project of hunting a stag for the easier 
prey for the deviating individual of a hare. Of course, humans would hunt the 
hare if they were completely egotistic utilitarians and the group would break 
apart. That hunter/gatherer bands survived the stag hunt trap for 150,000 years 
shows that humans, through genetic disposition, socialization and maintenance of 
rules, were capable of resisting this temptation.
In response to all three challenges we see dispositions which favor support for 
the common good over individual utility. These altruistic/communal dispositions 
underlie a sense of duty that is offset by a consciousness of rights (e.g., in food 
sharing). The balance of duties and rights represents, of course, a central aspect 
of justice/fairness. Reciprocity is another justice-related behavioral pattern which 
human society shares with primate societies. Primate reciprocity appears in food 
sharing and grooming: favors are acknowledged by returning favors, often with 
considerable temporal delay (de Waal 2015, pp. 175 f.). The most basic rules we 
are inclined to observe (most of us most of the time) and which shape the way 
justice/fairness is internalized genetically and culturally in primate and human 
groups, and which, from early human society on, have become institutionalized, 
are reciprocity, impartiality of arbitration, rules of sharing, and rules of participa-
tion (de Waal 2015, p. 49; Boehm 2001, 2012).
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The length of primate evolutionary history including pre-human forms is 
estimated to be 6 million years. Proto-human and human evolutionary history 
encompasses between 1.8 and 2.8 million years, long enough for selecting a 
genetic disposition adapted to group life, at a time when dispersed small groups 
living at considerable distance from each other had to reproduce by incestuous 
practices. This inbreeding created the conditions for the relatively rapid selec-
tion of intergroup differences in genetic dispositions. Even the gathering/hunting 
group/band stage of at least 150,000 years could be enough to establish relevant 
social dispositions in the human brain (Boehm 2001). It is not necessary for the 
whole population to have a strong prosocial disposition: Evolutionary simulation 
games have found that groups are adaptive with a mix of members of altruists, 
“punishers” (keen to avenge breaches of the rules), egotists and (isolationist) rul-
ers, as long as the first two types are prevalent (Fowler et al. 2011, p. 210).
2.4.2  The Justice Disposition in Our Brain: What Can We 
Learn from Neuroscience?
Neuroscience/neurobiology is among the most dynamic scientific fields (for an 
introduction see Damasio 2005). Progress is amazing. Some of the more relevant 
findings relate to the subject matter of this chapter.7 Key emotions have no single 
center in the brain (which was an early hypothesis), but emerge from the “coop-
eration” of several regions which can communicate neuronally or biochemically 
(for a survey of the roles of different parts of the brain see Schreiber 2011). Bio-
chemical connection means that regions in the brain trigger the flux of biochemi-
cal “messenger” substances (e.g., hormones) which, in turn, cause positive or 
negative feelings (e.g., joy, frustration, aggression or disgust). What we may call 
the “sense of fairness” (or justice) for want of a better expression is one of these 
structures of cooperation (Nam et al. 2017). As de Waal remarks, the mere fact 
that humans care about justice would not be there if a disposition to do so were 
not anchored in their genetic hard wiring (de Waal 2015, p. 44).
Being justly treated, in other words obtaining what people believe they are 
entitled to, or simply receiving the recognition they desire (and need) are among 
the experiences—all connected to positive relations to other human beings—
which trigger the production and transmission of the messenger substances 
7See Pinker (2011, Chaps. 8 and 9), and Hutchison and Bleiker (2014) for useful references 
from neuroscience from an IR perspective.
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(namely dopamine, endorphin, encephalin and oxytocin) that cause feelings of 
desire, happiness, sympathy, warmth, and so on. Experiences of being treated 
unjustly, of being denied what is due or being treated with contempt instead of 
respect cause feelings of resentment, aggression or even physical nausea ( Henrich 
et al. 2001; Singer 2007; Pinker 2011, p. 858). Experiments have also found that 
the perception of unfairness triggers strong emotions and willingness of the per-
son concerned to strike back against the perceived source of unfair treatment 
(Svirastava et al. 2009). These findings help to understand the everyday experi-
ence that both the satisfaction of being treated justly as well as the frustration 
of suffering perceived injustice are connected to strong emotions, in the latter 
case stimulating even violent reactions (Mercer 2010).  Pinker describes in great 
detail how the “wrath system” which we share with our vertebrate relatives fol-
lows registration of the experience of frustration or threat, and triggers defensive 
or offensive aggressive reactions. He also shows how this system is connected 
to a distinct second aggression-stimulating structure in the brain that is activated 
in competitive constellations and uses testosterone as the messenger substance. 
If the fighting escalates, the strategic use of violence degenerates into violence 
guided by blind wrath (Pinker 2011, pp. 736 ff.). Since the competitive disposi-
tion relates to the individual’s status and hence to the recognition dimension of 
justice, it is another path through which justice concerns may lead to the readi-
ness to apply violence (see also Mercer 2010).
Neuroplastics, one of the branches of neuroscience, investigates how not only 
neuronal connections but also certain aspects of the brain’s biochemistry are com-
pleted only after birth and as a result of experiences in early childhood (David-
son et al. 2000). From this research, it appears that the genetic dispositions which 
brain researchers have now located need a kind of interactive development in 
which the young brain requires positive stimulus from an empathic and loving 
environment to grow to full potential, not only in its cognitive and reflective but 
also in its emotive, moral and social capacities. Early feelings of being cared for 
(the equivalent of feelings of “recognition”) contribute to the capability to pro-
duce and trigger the flow of messenger substances which cause “good feelings” 
of happiness. Equally, the capability to develop empathy with others also appears 
to depend on the experience of being treated with empathy. Individuals who do 
not have these positive experiences in early childhood appear to develop deficits 
in this regard (Bauer 2004, 2010, pp. 54 ff.; for an excellent overview see Druck-
man 2008).
What is intriguing is the close connection between fairness/justice and 
“recognition”, and the key role this complex plays in switching the human 
mind between happiness and readiness to enter into conflict. Nancy Fraser has 
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 postulated recognition as the third type of human justice concern, apart from dis-
tributive and participative concerns (Fraser 2008). Axel Honneth puts recognition, 
or lack thereof, at the root of social and political conflict (Honneth 2010). From 
an IR perspective, Reinhard Wolf (2017) has emphasized the striving for respect 
shown by governments of all kinds and the negative reactions once such respect 
is denied. These deliberations are seen to be accurate in the light of what we can 
learn from neurobiologists and development psychologists, as is Ned Lebow’s 
insistence that the “spirit” (which can be understood as the need for recogni-
tion) is responsible for most conflicts between human collectivities (Lebow 2008, 
2010).8
As Joachim Bauer and other authors show, the motivational system of the 
human brain is programmed to strive for close relations with other people and 
with the group in which individuals live and where their identity is deeply rooted 
(Insel and Fernald 2004; Bauer 2010). People lacking this form of intense bond-
ing frequently display psychological deviance. These insights should not come as 
a surprise, because humans can only survive when they are embedded in social 
groups, and the ability to achieve this condition for survival requires robust dis-
positions in human genes. As neuroscientists tell us, precisely these dispositions 
exist. The desire for justice, and the positive and negative reactions depending on 
whether the individual is treated justly or not, is an important element of these 
dispositions, because just treatment confirms that group membership is a condi-
tion of the individual’s life.
From my readings, I would speculate that the justice aspect of recognition is 
not just a part of the whole complex that connects justice issues to emotions, but 
the most fundamental element because of—as argued in the previous section—
the central importance of being accepted by the group for individuals to survive. 
I hypothesize that the recognition issue is also the element that drives emotions in 
the realms of distribution and participatory justice. Being afforded what ( people 
believe) is their due signals recognition of the individual by the person or the 
group or the system that manages the distribution of the good in question. To be 
involved as a participant in decision making also signals recognition of the person 
as being entitled to play a meaningful role in the group. All these are essential 
aspects of the individual-group relationship, in which the individual has the great-
est stake, and toward which he/she is hard wired to strive, which is a major com-
ponent of our emotive and cognitive apparatus (see also Dutton 2006).
8On the meaning of recognition in international relations, see Daase et al. (2015).
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The relation between the sense of fairness/justice and empathy appears to be 
of particular importance: empathy is the basis of the capability to have active feel-
ings of alter-justice, that is, to empathize with positive or negative justice experi-
ences of other people (Mathur et al. 2010).9 The capability for empathy rests most 
fundamentally in a specific type of neuron in our brain, the mirror neurons. It ena-
bles us to quasi-simulate in ourselves what we observe another human or animal 
doing, experiencing, enjoying or suffering (our capacity to imitate is also derived 
from these neurons) (Bauer 2005; de Waal 2015, pp. 182 ff.). Measurements of 
brain activity have shown that in experiments people react positively to satisfac-
tion of the justice concerns of others and negatively to frustration of their justice 
concerns. Comparisons show that these empathic brain activities are somehow 
weaker than those occurring in connection with the individual’s own concerns, 
but are still clearly measurable. The same asymmetry has been found between the 
strength of empathy towards ingroup members as compared with members of an 
outgroup (Nam et al. 2017, p. 293; Hein et al. 2016; Cikara et al. 2012).
If the neuroscientists tell us about our disposition to be motivated by justice 
and to react to its manifestations, developmental psychologists show how these 
dispositions are activated and develop in very young humans. Notably Michael 
Tomasello’s work on early childhood has shown that empathy emerges very early 
in life, and that the first indications of a sense of justice manifest themselves in 
some individuals as early as 18 months. Make no mistake: children can be ego-
tistical, but all the same they recognize rules of reciprocity and of sharing and 
show emotions in connection with satisfied and frustrated claims not only by 
themselves but by their peers as well. Children of four to five years, left playing 
without supervision, have been observed adopting third-person justice perspec-
tives by prompting peers to share toys fairly with other children (Arsenio and 
Killen 1996). The research by developmental psychologists appears to imply that 
the dispositions that enable us to feel a “sense of justice” are activated early in 
and through social relations, and develop over the whole of childhood and adoles-
cence (Tomasello 2009).
Combining the findings of the two sciences, neuroscience and developmental 
psychology, suggests that our morality, to which a “sense of justice” is central, 
has a biological basis which unfolds its potential in interactions with the human-
social environment. The double evidence annihilates the notion of humans as cold 
and calculating utilitarian egotists. Of course this attitude exists and is also an 
9The capability for third-party fairness perspectives has also been found in bonobos and 
chimpanzees (de Waal and Lanting 1997; Brosnan et al. 2010).
472 Justice from an Interdisciplinary Perspective
expression of a disposition based in our “hard wiring”. But it is only part of the 
whole (see below). To confuse this part with the entirety of human dispositions 
leads to deficient anthropological assumptions and, as a corollary, misinformed 
social and political theory.
2.4.3  The Death of “Economic Man”: Evidence 
from Recent Work in Sociology, Behavioral 
Economics, and Neuroeconomics
Sociologists (Liebig and Lengfeld 2002) and experimental economists (Loewen-
stein et al. 1989; Fehr and Schmidt 1999) have verified in many experiments that 
people in games simulating distributive conflict and dilemmas deviate from the 
model of utility-maximizing behavior in favor of rules of fair distribution. Soci-
ologists and social psychologists have proven that such justice concerns apply to 
the individual as well as to collectives. These collectives can be small, such as the 
family or a peer group, mid-sized like a university, a city, or a soccer club, or may 
be large, such as a nation, an alliance, an ethnicity or a religion. Grouping frames 
can be structural and enduring, such as the groups just mentioned, or ad hoc and 
short-lived such as an experimental group put together by a social scientist. Even in 
these artificial groupings whose constructed character is known to all participants, 
the psychological, neuronal, and biochemical processes run with the same serious-
ness as in “real life” in the direction of we-feeling and empathy within the ingroup 
and the feeling of difference and distance towards outgroups (Pinker 2011, p. 773).
Social groups develop rules for dealing with justice issues among their mem-
bers which instantiate justice principles. Sociological justice research has identi-
fied the intracultural as well as intercultural diversity of these justice principles. 
This aspect is of particular relevance for the analysis of conflicts that emerge 
from conflicting justice principles postulated by different actors, and from the 
different application of the same principle to specific situations (Kals and Maes 
2012 document the breadth of this research).
Sociologists have also found that one of the most popular philosophical solu-
tions to the justice problem, John Rawls’s Difference Principle is not supported 
by real world people’s attitudes. Rawls’s Difference Principle permits diverging 
from strict equality “so long as the inequalities in question would make the least 
advantaged in society materially better off than they would be under strict equal-
ity” (Lamont and Favor 2017). Rawls postulated that inequality is legitimate only 
to the degree that it fosters disproportionate gains for the poorest. The most popu-
lar idea about justice as revealed in polls is a combination of the justice  principle 
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of need (people should be granted the basics for their existence) and the justice 
principle of merit (individuals contributing to the common good should obtain 
a share proportional to their contribution) (Frohlich et al. 1987; Frohlich and 
Oppenheimer 1992; Frohlich 2007).
This combination is indicative of a certain flexibility of individuals in adher-
ing to several justice principles. They may combine them, but they may also 
switch between them, depending on which one is more favorable for themselves 
or for their ingroup in a given situation. This opportunism of choice appears to 
be less a matter of conscious strategic choice in a selfish-utilitarian frame than of 
an intuitive, pre-cognitive decision which receives justification only after it has 
been taken, and it does not negate the existence of an inherent “sense of fairness” 
which is at the root of even this selfish version of justice behavior as well as of 
more altruistic phenomena (Valdesolo and DeSteno 2008). The psychological 
phenomenon called “self-serving bias” is common (Trivers 2011).
In experimental (behavioral) economics, the paradigmatic test for a “sense 
of fairness” is the ultimatum game (Fehr and Schmidt 1999): A finite number of 
chips or coins, say, ten, is given to a player who has to offer a share to a second 
player. If the partner accepts it, this distribution is implemented, and each player 
keeps the money that the distribution leads to. If the second player refuses, nei-
ther of the players receives a reward. According to economic rationality, the sec-
ond player should accept any distribution which brings a gain greater than zero, 
and the first player should not offer more than the smallest possible sum. In fact, 
second players refuse—emotionally—what they regard as “unfair” offers ( usually 
offers below a third of the sum available). Most of the time first players offer 
forty to fifty percent. This means that not only do second players betray a self-
related sense of appropriate fairness, but first players either anticipate that second 
players will act according to a fairness norm or are acting out of their own feeling 
that a fair offer is appropriate. The ultimatum game findings held up across cul-
tures in a major comparative study featuring societies from Latin America, Papua 
New Guinea, Mongolia and Africa. At the same time, cultural and market struc-
ture differences contribute to considerable variation in behavioral detail (Henrich 
et al. 2004).
Since the original findings were published, the rapidly growing field of experi-
mental/behavioral economics and neuro-economics has buried “economic man” 
for good. Cooperative impulses, internalized norms of fairness with a strong root 
in reciprocity, empathy, and, above all, the embedding in social groups contradict 
the orthodox idea of unfettered utilitarian individualism, and deviate  significantly 
from neoliberal and neoclassical orthodoxy (Gintis et al. 2005). The entire range 
of motives on the basis of which humans act presents an amalgam of selfish and 
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 altruistic, rational-strategic and emotional drivers for economic and political choices 
and a considerable influence of the cultural and institutional environment, including 
the incentives it offers to actors (cf. Glimcher and Fehr 2013; Haidt 2007).
We are accustomed to thinking of politics, notably high politics related to 
conflicts of interest, peace and war, as distinct from ethical and moral considera-
tions to which justice issues belong. We are equally accustomed under rational-
ist hegemony to think of this realm as the fiefdom of cool strategic calculation, 
remote from emotions. But if the sense of justice is part of both our genetic and 
our cultural inheritance (de Waal 2015, p. 63; Haidt 2007; Lamont and Favor 
2017), then from the very beginning it has been implausible that politics, as a 
central area of human activity, could be isolated from its influence. In the end, 
this is an empirical question, and the findings, as far as they exist, point in the 
direction that justice matters.
2.5  Justice, War and Peace: The Ambivalence of the 
Human Inheritance
2.5.1  The Ambivalence Inside
The impact of the justice issue in society and politics hinges on the ambivalent 
and contradictory predispositions of the human mind. Here I follow Boehm’s 
summary of this problem. Accordingly, we have inherited the disposition to domi-
nance, submission, and resentment of dominance side by side. Together with our 
dispositions for prosocial attitudes such as empathy, compassion, a sense of fair-
ness, and the drive for cooperation and community, we harbor in our brain struc-
ture dispositions to egotism, nepotism (that is, to show prosocial behavior and 
accompanying emotions only to a small ingroup) and universally-directed altru-
ism. These dispositions are stratified as they manifest themselves in decreasing 
strength the wider the circle of possible beneficiaries is. All this is not simply cul-
turally constructed, but “anchored in human nature” (Boehm 2001, pp. 225 ff.; for 
recent empirical support see Magraw-Mickelson and Gollwitzer 2018). Boehm 
summarizes:
The evolutionary saga ends with a species altruistic enough to cooperate quite 
efficiently in large or small groups, but at the same time prone to competition and 
conflict…Our most amazing accomplishments are complex societies that verge on 
being antlike in their divisions of labor and organic cooperation – and also in their 
unusual capacity to go to war (Boehm 2001, p. 254).
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It goes without saying that, like all genetic dispositions, the ones discussed here 
are distributed among people unequally: Most individuals have all of them, but in 
different strengths (McDermott 2014, p. 558). In addition, the preceding discus-
sion indicates that our dispositions are varied and contradictory enough to present 
the basis for “radically different behavioral outcomes at the level of the pheno-
type”, because they make an almost unlimited variety of combinations possible 
(Boehm 2001, pp. 236 f.).
One particular dark side of our capability to feel and think in justice terms 
is our inclination to frame justifications in terms of justice arguments when we 
explain why we do (or have done) harm to others. They can be framed as deal-
ing out retributive justice to a rule-breaker (including revenge); justifications can 
also be derived from the inherently unjust nature of our opponent (such as the 
“unjust enemy” of Immanuel Kant [Müller 2014]). From there it is only a small 
step to the argument that we were justified in doing harm to a person to prevent 
or limit harm being done to third parties (protection) or ourselves (self-defense) 
(Baumeister 1997).
In order to understand the power of the justice factor in politics, it is essen-
tial to overcome the methodological individualism that still permeates the social 
sciences. There is still intense discussion about the possibility of states being 
“actors”, of groups having collective identities or of the masses having shared 
feelings. For sociologists or economists versed in group experiments or for neu-
roscientists measuring brain activity during collective experiences the issue has 
long been settled. In recent years, neuroscientists have identified practices that 
stimulate regions in the brain whose neuronal circuits trigger particularly intense 
we-feelings simultaneously among entire groups of participants. These involve 
synchronous movement or vocal actions such as marching, dancing, singing, 
rhythmic shouting (e.g., of slogans), etc. (Farmer and Maister 2017, pp. 338 ff.). 
Taking part in a mass demonstration or in the vocal support of the home team 
in an exciting football match creates an emotional identity that can be mobilized 
for good or bad—Hitler knew that all too well (Crawford 2014, p. 536) as did 
the perpetrators of the Rwanda genocide (Ross 2014). At a more complex level, 
emotions can be collectivized by institutionalization (Crawford 2014). Collective 
emotions in this sense—the uniform focusing of emotions by many individuals on 
the same target—is characteristic of justice claims by groups adhering to identity 
concepts such as nation, ethnic group, religion, or ideology. These are possibly 
the most devastating grouping frames in terms of their capability to direct com-
mon identity into collective violence against outsiders (Pinker 2011, pp. 824 ff.). 
Collective emotions can thus also be ascribed to, and mobilized by, states (Mercer 
2014).
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The collective pursuit of a group’s justice claims governs intergroup compe-
tition where the potential of aggressive emotions is high (Pinker 2011, pp. 767, 
772 f.). The diminishing strength of emotions from individual claims through 
ingroup claims to outgroup claims contains the potential for a fateful reversal in 
the case of intergroup justice conflicts: We deny the outgroup the right to make 
justice claims at all, and frame them as enemies who deny us (our ingroup) what 
is rightfully ours. The mechanism of collective “evilization” triggers escala-
tory emotions that end in a “we or they” showdown, where only the complete 
destruction of the enemy will bring justice (Monroe et al. 2000; Müller 2014). 
The process is a particularly dangerous variant of the ingroup-outgroup dynamics 
analyzed by Henry Tajfel and his collaborators, and is a common element of the 
security dilemma, enemy image production and the escalation of conflicts (Tajfel 
1982). Understanding of the biological substrate of the ingroup/outgroup distinc-
tion and its evaluative and emotional expression in the human brain has made 
considerable advances in the last two decades, even though many questions have 
yet to be answered (Jost et al. 2014; Iyengar and Westwood 2015).
However, the path from “altering” a person/group as part of the process of 
identity building to evilization, that is to say, drawing the line for violent conflict, 
has not been determined with finality. As de Waal found in his studies on bonobos 
(see above), even among primates a clash is not inevitable when two groups meet 
or when an individual approaches a foreign group. Being “other” does not auto-
matically lead to being designated an enemy, as Tajfel himself observed (Tajfel 
1982, p. 16; see also Turner 1978, p. 249; Brewer 1999, p. 434).10 As Boehm 
reminded us, empathy and the sense of fairness can extend beyond the core or 
wider family and include unrelated persons. In a much broader historical con-
text, it is obvious that humans have the capability to imagine bonds and extend 
borders, possibly not completely arbitrarily, but with a high degree of flexibility. 
Our innate capability to feel empathy and even altruism towards other people is, 
in principle, almost unlimited (Batson 2011; Pinker 2011, pp. 859 ff.). For that 
reason, the triadic structure proposed by Boehm, the differentiation between ego-
tism, nepotism and altruism should not be taken as involving discrete alterna-
tives, but rather as a continuum, in which the range of “altruism” encompasses 
the inclusion of a few strangers into a small ingroup and extends through mid-
dle-sized and large groups to essentially universalistic altruism. If this amazing 
emotional flexibility of the “expanding circle” which the human brain permits did 
not exist, the building of ever larger social and political units beyond people’s 
10I owe the suggestion to examine this literature to Una Becker-Jakob.
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closest kin, for which identity bonds were construed in human history, would 
not have been possible (Singer 2011). That the bonds (and the emotions which 
they nurture) become less intense the wider the scope and the more people they 
 encompass might be generally true, but given the enormous intensity of national-
ism or common religion as a bonding emotion and the motivational force to use 
violence in its service shows that scope and intensity are not perfectly correlated, 
and that even the widening of the circle of empathy, we-feeling, and justice still 
contains the dark side of excluding those who allegedly don’t belong to the group.
It is for this reason that studying techniques and practices that prevent the 
alienating consequences of ingroup/outgroup dynamics or even roll back preju-
dices against the “other” are of utmost importance for peacemaking and peace-
building. Experimental psychological studies have shown that relatively simple 
pedagogical practices such as perspective-taking (e.g., writing an essay on a con-
flict from the viewpoint of the other side) change existing brain reactions towards 
this outgroup for the better. Synchronous movement with people of a prejudiced 
group produce results similar to what these practices engender in homogeneous 
groups (see above), thus helping to diminish intergroup social distance. Even 
more amazing results have been produced by electronic simulation techniques 
which show that the person being studied was handling an avatar from a prej-
udiced social group. The resulting process of identification (and concomitant 
prejudice-deconstruction) appears to be related to the simultaneous challenge of 
non-conscious (bodily) and conscious (conceptual) parts of the research partici-
pant’s identity (Farmer and Maister 2017, pp. 337 ff.). Another study found that 
the asymmetry in empathy between ingroup and outgroup disappeared after a few 
instances of experiencing (unexpected) help from outgroup members (Hein et al. 
2016). Thus, the plasticity of feelings towards the outgroup offers a promising 
approach for tackling the difficult dilemma of contradictory justice claims distrib-
uted across two identity groups. These practices for enhancing empathy towards 
groups previously regarded as hostile, alien or unpleasant could help to under-
stand the sources of hostile justice claims and to overcome seemingly unalterable 
antagonistic positions in justice conflicts.
2.5.2  The Ambiguity of Justice
Principally, our disposition for justice is not impartial or symmetrical. Our read-
ing of what is fair is biased in a selfish way, individually as well as collectively 
(Babcock et al. 1995). Thus we react most strongly when our own individual 
 justice claims are concerned (egotism). We are considerably engaged when those 
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of our ingroup (our close relatives at the top) are involved (nepotism). And we 
have the capability, still measurable but definitely weaker than the first two, to 
develop empathy with the justice claims of strangers (including outgroups) 
(Boehm 2001, 2012). It is this latter capability on which the pacifying potential of 
justice rests. It is the former two capabilities which drive its potential for conflict.
The impact of justice issues on human affairs and political relations can there-
fore apply pressure in two opposite directions. Justice is part of overall moral-
ity and one of the highest moral values. As Pinker demonstrates, morality itself 
is ambiguous (Pinker 2011, pp. 923 ff.). Humans build moral communities along 
the ingroup-outgroup divide. These moral communities may, but need not, coin-
cide with other bonding characteristics (class, ethnicity, religion, and nation). 
Since morality is prone to create absolutes, ingroup-outgroup relations quickly 
produce attitudes of alienation, condescension, and hostility. Boehm adds the bit-
terly ironic point that morality might be at the root of the extraordinary capacity 
of the human species to engage in large-scale, immensely costly wars: without 
morality, individuals could not be shamed into military service, and without altru-
ism, nobody would be willing to sacrifice his/her life for the sake of the commu-
nity (Boehm 2001, p. 254; Rudolph 2017, pp. 174 f.).
It follows that as a central moral principle, justice in politics is also bound to 
engender these ambivalent consequences. On the one hand, the settlement of dis-
putes becomes possible, and solutions have a chance of being lasting if and when 
they satisfy the justice claims of all relevant actors or are perceived by them as 
reasonably just when the outcomes for all parties are compared (Zartman 1997, 
2008, pp. 74 ff.). On the other hand, incompatible justice claims or contradictory 
justice principles applied to a specific case may lead to enduring disputes and 
stimulate high levels of emotion, which make the rational management of con-
flict difficult or impossible and motivate parties to take recourse to violent behav-
ior (Welch 1993; Müller 2013). In the realm of retributive justice, threatening the 
perpetrators of atrocities with legal prosecution, for example through the Interna-
tional Criminal Court, may not only sustain motivation to continue violent con-
flict rather than seek compromise, but can also create secondary justice conflicts 
through resentment among followers or supporters of perceived arbitrary prosecu-
tion of their leaders, but not those of the opposite party (Porok 2017).
Different ideas about what justice means in general or in specific situations are 
possible because our basic genetic disposition for the “sense of justice” does not 
determine the substance with which we fill the term “justice” (Druckman 2008). 
This “filling” takes place during the long socialization process humans are sub-
jected to, and differs among cultures. Different traditions bring about different 
preferences for principles of justice and different ways of interpreting how they 
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are to be applied: culture matters in presenting the frame in which our disposi-
tions take a particular substantive shape during our socialization (Boehm 2001, 
pp. 244 f.).11
As a consequence, there are vastly different ideas in the world—and in the 
minds and souls of humans—concerning what justice means and how it should 
be implemented. The well-meaning attempts of philosophers and religious theo-
rists to develop a supposedly universally valid conception of justice from their 
respective cultural traditions are in vain, because they are trapped in a particular 
perspective and cannot shake off pluralism of conceptions. Even the most honest 
attempt to take an “objective position” can never be certain that intrinsic bias has 
not affected cognition, deliberation and evaluation.12 When their ideas become 
part of national cultures, such efforts to create a universal theory with cogent 
validity may even deepen rifts and stimulate conflict by developing strong dog-
mas that are hard to overcome, thus influencing political preferences and stimu-
lating a missionary drive towards universalization directed against the justice 
ideas reigning elsewhere.
There is another area where the human inclination to invest emotions in jus-
tice claims against others can trigger an escalatory spiral of violence: an inte-
gral part of justice is retributive justice. One important merit of the civilization 
process is the deprivatization of retributive justice (punishment for wrongdoing) 
and its takeover by the state. Nevertheless, people’s feeling of having been hurt, 
betrayed, offended, discriminated against, or humiliated by another actor still 
drives the desire for revenge (Pinker 2011, pp. 783 ff.) even within states gov-
erned by the rule of law; it is a very dangerous trigger of violence in fragmented 
societies where the fragments have strong identities, and it is also strong in the 
international realm (e.g., Fattah and Fierke 2009). The lust for revenge is the indi-
vidual emotion which is involved here, and it is coupled with the structures of 
wrath and aggression in our brain. It can suppress empathy toward the offender, 
and successful revenge can trigger emotions of happiness, notably in men (Singer 
11It should be noted, however, that recent research appears to confirm the hypothesis that 
genetic dispositions may even influence humans’ inclination towards egalitarian or, alter-
natively, merit-related justice principles. This is not reported to be a strictly determining 
influence, but a disposition that makes it more likely that individuals incline towards one 
end of the justice-principle spectrum. Individual life experience and—to a much lesser 
degree—socialization interact with the genetic disposition and impact on the outcome as 
well (Batrićević and Littvay 2017).
12I call this constellation “the cultural uncertainty principle” (Müller 2009, Chap. 3).
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et al. 2006). Fortunately, our genetic inheritance contains still another structure 
which makes us inclined to forgive, and thus dampens the impulse to take revenge 
when we suffer injustice (McCullough 2008).
2.5.3  Justice, War and Peace
How these ambiguities can combine in an internationally relevant way has been 
demonstrated by social psychologists (Platow et al. 2014). They polled citizens 
of Australia, New Zealand, and the United States on how the Olympic perfor-
mance of national teams should be measured; the standard measure is the total 
number of Olympic medals. While Americans found it bewildering that anybody 
could think of anything else than the standard metric, Australians and even more 
strongly, New Zealanders, believed that this standard was unfair, and that instead 
population size and/or Gross National Product should be taken into account (e.g., 
medals per citizen should be the metric applied). Citizens of the three nations 
were in complete agreement that nations should be compared according to a just 
standard, but disagreed profoundly on what “just” meant in the given situation, 
and each nationality chose the measure that would favor the prestige of their own 
nation. What looks quite harmless in this example can become much more serious 
in other constellations, of course.
The—largely unconscious—tilting of the sense of justice in our own favor and 
its use to place outgroups and their members at a disadvantage is part of what Ste-
ven Pinker has rightly dubbed “the moralization gap” (Pinker 2011, pp. 721 ff.). 
Justice as a core value of any moralistic system, and in a consensual or compro-
mise-ready environment favorable for the establishment of lasting peace, can turn 
into a tool for creating horrific injustice in the very name of justice, all the way to 
genocidal violence.
It is thus not surprising that in his pioneering study on justice and war David 
Welch found a strong impact of justice claims and conflicts in most of the major 
international conflicts between great powers since 1815 (Welch 1993). Nations 
as imagined communities (Anderson 1991) achieve coherence in their national 
identities from the feeling that their own ingroup is better than the others. Conse-
quently, their own justice claims (e.g., the claim on territory or for higher status 
than others) are seen as justified, while equal or equivalent claims by others are 
not. Since strong emotions are attached to these collective claims, compromising 
is extremely difficult and leaders who try to commit to compromise risk their rep-
utation, power and—in the extreme case—their life, as Egyptian President Sadat 
did in the case of the Camp David agreement and Israeli Prime Minister Rabin 
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did in the case of the Oslo Agreement. Currently, we are watching attentively the 
way in which the Greek and Macedonian leaders are experiencing harsh criticism 
for their completely reasonable compromise on the decades-old quarrel about the 
name of Macedonia. The jury is still out on the outcome.
Justice, one of the noblest traits of human beings, hard wired in the brain and 
imprinted into the mind by socialization and constant practice, can thus degen-
erate into the stimulus for the worst instincts that our species harbors. On the 
other hand, empathy for the justice claims of others can help enlightened leaders 
cut Gordian knots of enduring conflict and find solutions that “do justice” to all 
claimants, laying to rest deadly quarrels that had prevailed for so long. There is 
no magic algorithm for granting victory to the “better angels” in our mind, as Ste-
ven Pinker put it, and there is no final institutional structure for human affairs that 
would reliably cause permanent justice and permanent peace. Rather, outcomes 
depend on practices, and the practitioners are humans with their inexorable bifur-
cated inclination to do both good and bad in the name of justice, to make peace as 
well as to make war.
2.6  Conclusion
Continuing progress in a variety of sciences will engender a revolution in our own 
fields of political science, international relations, and peace studies. The main-
stream has experienced a taste of the ongoing change, as the 2017 Supplement of 
International Organization on “The Behavioral Revolution and International Rela-
tions” documents. The explicit aim of this collection of articles is to assess the 
“challenge” posed “to rationalist models” by the “behavioral revolution” that has 
“swept across the social sciences in the last few decades” (Hafner-Burton et al. 
2017, pp. S2 f.). However, as this chapter has shown, the concept of a “behavioral” 
revolution presented there falls far short of what is really happening. The authors 
of the introductory article and the authors of most of the remaining papers are 
seeking ways of integrating insights into empirical human behavior that present 
“anomalies” in the perspective of the hegemonic behavioral model of rationalism. 
They accept heterogeneous preferences and risk-taking, take the asymmetrical val-
uation of losses and gains identified by prospect theory into account, recognize 
the influence of emotions and beliefs, and amalgamate these innovations with the 
rationalist model, but in a way that transfers everything new to complementary 
aspects of “economic man” (Hafner-Burton et al. 2017). The task is then reduced 
to defining the scope conditions under which rationality prevails and using the 
complementary explanatory tools to explain extant deviations. Occasionally, it 
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appears to dawn on the authors that more is at stake, such as when they state that 
findings like motivated reasoning or social preference may “require rethinking the 
axiomatic foundations of rational choice itself” (Hafner-Burton et al. 2017, p. 18). 
This insight, however, is not borne out in this volume. Rather, it demonstrates a 
classic case of Kuhn’s “science in crisis”, in which scholars work hard to integrate 
findings into the hegemonic paradigm, while these findings constitute insuperable 
contradictions to the same paradigm (Kuhn 1962, Chap. 7).13
In fact, we are not facing just a “behavioral revolution”, a term which sug-
gests a change in methods from deductive to inductive research, based on empiri-
cal insights into human behavior gained by new methods. We are confronted with 
an ontological revolution that forces us to reconstruct our image of the human 
(Crawford 2011). As suggested at the end of the previous section, the human 
mind is a mixed bag, and its contents are involved in perception, evaluation, and 
decision making. Morality and emotions always interfere with selfishness and 
rationality—no supposedly rational cognition or decision occurs without the 
involvement of emotions (Ellsworth 2014; McDermott 2014, p. 558), even when 
the prefrontal cortex does most of the work. A new standard model of behavior 
has to start from this mixed bag and must be freshly constructed from scratch. 
The rational choice model can serve as the ideal type of a special case, the scope 
conditions of which have to be carefully researched and determined (Gross Stein 
2017), but should not be imposed as the default option of “normalcy” from the 
outset.
A changed image of the human species that concerns both individual motives 
and reactions and how they combine to affect the behavior of collectivities from 
small groups to states (Hutchison and Bleiker 2014; Mercer 2014; Crawford 
2011) opens many new roads for our discipline. The central and ambiguous posi-
tion of the justice issue in politics can be far better explored from this perspective 
than from the old hegemonic one.
In order to harness the new opportunities scholars will have to do three things: 
First, to acquire a basic knowledge on the related findings and the paradigms in 
which they are rooted. Second, to develop practices of interdisciplinary work 
13It is telling that Richard Ned Lebow, who from an early stage had criticized the ration-
alist paradigm from a perspective emphasizing motivational bias (Lebow 1981) and has 
constructed an alternative anthropological model in which non-rational drivers (striving for 
honor, fear) play a central role (Lebow 2008), does not even appear in the huge list of refer-
ences attached to the introductory article. An alternative standard model is not admitted by 
those standing guard over the hegemonic paradigm.
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that go far beyond the sporadic encounters, contacts, and single projects that 
have been beacons of synthetic insights of great potential but for the most part 
have not led to systematic joint progress across disciplines. Third, to sincerely 
sift through the assumptions underlying our established theories and correct them 
or even abandon them in the light of what is becoming the state of the art else-
where. Neither economic materialism nor preference-based rationalism, neither 
“economic man” nor “ideational woman” will stand the test. They can serve, use-
fully, as ideal types to explore empirical deviations from their idealized assump-
tions. Their role is reduced to that of being epistemological tools. They cannot be 
used as ontological templates to decipher the empirical world. The philosophical 
tradition in which these theories are located have emphasized dichotomies, such 
as cognition/emotion, deliberation/feeling, selfishness/altruism, empathy/hate. 
Again, these dichotomies are useful heuristic tools for distinguishing the related 
sources and expressions of human behavior, that is, epistemological instruments. 
Ontologically, however, these apparent opposites are mixed and intermingled 
in the material (biological) basis of human behavior. Our “nature” is thus much 
more complex and more ambiguous than the traditional simplification into these 
dichotomies suggests. This makes the analysis of political problems and their 
solution even more burdened and onerous than the “old” ontologies indicated. 
It is nevertheless inescapable to include the profound recent insights in human 
nature into our analysis. The relationship between justice and peace is a good 
place to start. But the landscape upon which the door is opening is much broader; 
it encompasses the whole field in which we are working.
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